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Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition
Motsamai Molefe
Ethics Studies, University of KwaZulu Natal, Durban, South Africa
ABSTRACT
It is generally accepted that the normative idea of personhood is central to African moral
thought, but what has not been done in the literature is to explicate its relationship to the
Western idea of rights. In this article, I investigate this relationship between rights and an
African normative conception of personhood. My aim, ultimately, is to give us a cursory
sense why duties engendered by rights and those by the idea of personhood will tend to
clash. To facilitate a meaningful philosophical discussion, I locate this engagement in the
context of a debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye about the nature of Afro-
communitarianism, whether it will ground rights as primary or secondary. I endorse
Menkiti’s stance that duties are primary and rights secondary; and, I also problematise
moderate communitarianism for taking a Western stance by employing a naturalist
approach to rights.
Introduction
What is the relationship between the normative idea of personhood in African moral
thought and the idea of rights? The normative idea of personhood was first identified
by Ifeanyi Menkiti, a Nigerian philosopher. It refers to agents who lead morally virtuous
lives (Menkiti 1984, 2004). I ask this question because Menkiti (1984, 180) observes that
rights in an African axiological system are ranked secondary to the primacy of our
duties to the collective. Unfortunately, Menkiti never offered a philosophical argument
to defend this position that departs from the global sway of rights.
The proposition that relegates rights to a secondary status in an Afro-communitarian
system in favour of the priority of duties has been scathed for being ‘excessive’, ‘unrest-
ricted’ and/or ‘radical’ view since it does not properly recognise the relevance and
primacy of rights (Gyekye 1992, 103–104, 108). Other African scholars have also insisted
on the primacy of rights in an African tradition (Wiredu 1996; Deng 2004; Metz 2011;
Oyowe 2014).
In this article, I give moral-theoretical content to Menkiti’s stance that duties take pri-
ority over rights in an African moral-political system. To do so, I invoke the idea of person-
hood since it is at the heart of an Afro-communitarian axiological system. The idea of
personhood, I hope to demonstrate, entails a purely other-regarding morality of duties;
it is these duties that take priority over rights. Rights are considered to be secondary
because they will have a tendency to clash with the fundamental moral-social goal
posited by a morality of duties of securing the well-being of all human beings entailed
by this idea of personhood.
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What makes this project worth taking seriously is its attempt to give philosophical
content to a position that has been thought to be obviously implausible in the literature:
the idea that duties take priority over rights1 (Gyekye 1992, 1997; Matolino 2009; Fama-
nikwa 2010). This article goes against the current of influence in terms of questioning
the place that rights ought to occupy in African political thought: the idea that rights
are universal and all that African scholars have to do is to domesticate them (Cobbah
1987; Ake 1987; Deng 2004).
My position as an African scholar born in a world that still bears features of colonisation
and Western influence is that we need to proceed from a position of intellectual suspicion
with regard to values born out of the Western enlightenment project (MacIntyre 2003),
particularly when there are Western scholars who cast doubt on the ontological status
of this very idea of rights2 (MacIntyre 2003) and more so when we are in the political
space burdened with African people seeking African solution to African problems
(Biko 2004). This intellectual suspicion is born out of a political objective to seek local
axiological strategies for securing the human good without appeal to rights, particularly
given that we are aware that rights are just ‘one way’ to secure a life of dignity and this
way is reported to be ‘foreign’ to non-Western societies including Africa (Donnely 2009,
12, 1982a, 303).
In this article, I do not go as far as rejecting rights completely. Rather, I simply limit
myself to giving philosophical content to Menkiti’s idea that duties take priority over
them. To make a case for the primacy of duties and the secondary status of rights in
African moral thought, I proceed in the following fashion. I begin by revisiting Menkiti’s
analysis of an African notion of personhood. Here, I demonstrate that Menkiti employed
three distinct notions of a ‘person’ and only one is crucial to his project: the idea that per-
sonhood is something that has to be achieved. Secondly, I proceed to roughly demon-
strate that Gyekye’s criticism and solution to ground rights employs a different notion
of personhood from one used by Menkiti; he appeals to one that is dominant in a
Western tradition. Finally, I conclude by demonstrating that the notion of personhood
central to Menkiti’s analysis entails a morality of duties to secure the well-being of all.
The idea of personhood represents an African approach to secure a life of dignity.
Revisiting Menkiti on ‘personhood’
Much of the confusion in a quest to articulating a plausible conception of Afro-communi-
tarianism can be attributed to the ambiguity attending the notion of personhood in the
literature (Metz 2013, 7; Molefe 2016). To make moral-theoretical progress in articulating
Afro-communitarianism, we need to be clear about different notions of personhood. I
identify three distinct notions of personhood in Menkiti’s analysis. These are: (1) person-
hood as a claim about personal identity; (2) personhood as a claim about moral status
and (3) personhood as a claim about human beings who are morally upright or virtuous.
It is unfortunate that Menkiti does not distinguish these distinct ideas of personhood
the way I just did, rather he leaves it to the reader to pick them out. Menkiti (1984, 171,
author’s emphasis) merely informs us that he is after ‘a certain conception of the
person found in African traditional thought’. This assertion does not quite help us to
understand which one is central to his analysis. Below, I begin by teasing out these
three distinct notions of a person.
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In Menkiti’s analysis, I note the first notion of a person as one typical in Afro-
communitarian articulations of how individuals come to form personal identities. In this
light, he notes:
… the African view of man denies that persons can be defined by focusing on this or that
physical or psychological characteristic of the lone individual. Rather, man is defined by
reference to the environing community. As John Mbiti notes, the African view of the
person can be summed up in this statement: ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore
I am’ (1984, 171).
It is important to note that here Menkiti is talking about an African view of a ‘man’ in
context where he distinguishes it from Western notions of a person. It is safe to assume
that he uses the notion of a ‘man’ interchangeably to that of a ‘person’. This is hardly sur-
prising because this is exactly how John Mbiti, whom he quotes, also uses these terms
(1969, 108–109). Menkiti notes that a Western view deﬁnes a person in terms of some
feature(s) intrinsic in a human being like consciousness, memory or rationality. Concomi-
tantly, an African view deﬁnes a person by relying on the environing community. It is
obvious that Menkiti is not interested here in giving a ‘philosophical anthropological’
account of a human person, that is, an account that speciﬁes properties that constitute
a human being, be they physical or spiritual (see, Kaphagawani 2004). I say so because
an ‘environing community’ is not a ontological feature of a human being, rather it
refers to external socio-cultural factors that are crucial in the process of becoming a
human being in the sense of forming a personal identity.
What begins to emerge here is that one cannot become a normal functioning human
being without being inserted in an ‘environment’ with other human beings; hence, the
idea, ‘I am because we are’. Personal identity here is understood primarily in terms of
‘being-with-others’ (Louw 2004; Menkiti 2004, 324). This position is further supported by
Menkiti when he comments:
… as far as Africans are concerned, the reality of the communal world takes precedence over
the reality of individual life histories… it is by first knowing this community as a stubborn per-
during fact of the psychophysical world that the individual also comes to know himself as a
durable, more or less permanent, fact of this world…What is more, the sense of self-identity
which the individual comes to possess cannot be made sense of except by reference to these
collective facts (1984, 172, author’s emphasis).
Here, Menkiti becomes explicit about what he means by an idea of an environment. By
‘environment’ he has in mind what he refers to as the ‘communal world’ that a human
being is born into and he also speaks of it as a world of ‘collective facts’. So, Menkiti’s
talk of an environment refers to the whole gamut of a culture that serves as an incubator
in the process of socialisation (humanisation) and also of forming personal identity. More
explicitly he tells us that self-identity is possible only by reference to these collective (cul-
tural) facts. In other words, Menkiti makes claims about socialisation and how individuals
come to form their personal identities. And, in this process of identity formation, he insists
that the community or social relationships are decisive.
So, the first sense of personhood refers to the fact that individuals in a communitarian
context essentially require relationships to form personal identities. This is a metaphysical
view that merely describes how human beings come to form their identities.
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The second notion of personhood is found when Menkiti invokes John Rawls in his dis-
cussion of personhood. Menkiti seems to think that Rawls is his ally in articulating a par-
ticular notion of a person that he considers salient in African thought. He notes ‘John
Rawls, of the Western-born philosophers, comes closest to a recognition of this importance
of ethical sense in the definition of personhood’ (Menkiti 1984, 178). Menkiti thinks Rawls’
own normative notion of a person comes close to his own. I observe, however, that Rawls’
notion of personhood is far removed from Menkiti’s construction. Menkiti cites Rawls to
clarify this notion:
Equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance
with the public understanding of the initial situation. One should observe that moral person-
ality is here defined as a potentiality that is ordinarily realized in due course. It is this potenti-
ality which brings the claims of justice into play… The sufficient condition for equal justice [is]
the capacity for moral personality. (178)
It is crucial to note that the notion of personhood employed by Rawls is essentially associ-
ated with ‘equal justice’. In other words, the notion he has in mind is dependent on facts
possessed by human beings in virtue of which their equality is recognised. Rawls refers to
this feature possessed by human beings as a capacity to be party to a contract or what he
refers to as an initial situation. Those who possess the relevant capacity are owed duties of
justice. The very language of capacity implies that personhood here is conceived as a func-
tion of some feature intrinsic to a human being, and that this feature is possessed by all
human beings; hence a talk of ‘equal justice’. Beings who have a moral personality by pos-
sessing the relevant psychological properties count as persons insofar as they are moral
patients.
Talk of personhood in this sense is usually referred to in a Western context as ‘moral
status’ (Behrens 2013). The idea of ‘moral status’ has to do with an identification of
some feature or capacity possessed by some entity in virtue of which it counts as a
moral patient and as such deserving moral regard (Toscano 2011; Behrens 2013). This
idea of personhood is a patient-centered one since it is concerned about what is due to
some entity not for what it does or has done but merely because it has the relevant
capacity or properties (Darwall 1977).3 In other words, put more simply, some being is
worthy of respect merely for being the kind of a being it is, depending on what property
is thought to be crucial, be it rationality, sentience or capacity for love (Metz 2012).
The last notion of personhood is also a moral notion except that it is an agent-centered
one. To refer to some human being as a person, in this sense, it is to commend her moral
conduct; it is to judge her as morally praiseworthy or morally standing out (Wiredu 2009).
Those agents who successfully live according to norms of a society are considered persons
and those who do not as non-persons (Gyekye 1997). What is granted here is a status that
reflects one’s moral achievement and what is denied is this kind of status, without making
claims about one’s biological status as a human being. The evaluation at play is at a moral
level. It is for this reason that Menkiti (1984, 176) informs us that ‘personhood is the sort of
thing which has to be attained’ and one who has it is ‘marked by a widened maturity of
ethical sense – an ethical maturity without which personhood is conceived as eluding one’.
Menkiti also marries this idea to what he refers to as ‘moral arrival’ or ‘triumph’ and those
who have triumphed he characterises them as having ‘inbuilt excellencies’ (Menkiti 1984,
173, 2004, 326). I understand this talk of personhood in terms of ‘widened maturity’, ‘moral
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arrival’ and ‘inbuilt excellencies’ to refer to human beings whose lives are characterised by
moral virtue or sound characters (Behrens 2013).
Though both these two last notions of personhood are moral, they differ in significant
ways. One is patient-centred and the other is agent-centred. In other words, moral status is
concerned about the respect every human being should get merely because they are
human; and, the agent-centred one refers to respect an agent earns relative to individual
performance. On a patient-centred notion, respect tracks ontology; and, on the agent-
centred one, it tracks performance. Since, the former tracks ontology that respect under
considerations is invariable, all those who have the relevant ontology are to be respected
in spite of their performance; and, on the latter, here respect is variable and varies relative
to one’s moral achievements.4
These are three distinct notions of personhood that I find in Menkiti’s article on person-
hood, but Menkiti is ultimately after a certain notion of personhood. I here submit that
Menkiti is ultimately after the agent-centred notion of personhood, and there is conver-
gence in the literature to support this view (Wiredu 1992, 2009; Dzobo 1992; Gyekye
1997; Ikuenobe 2006; Metz 2007, 2010; Behrens 2013; Molefe 2016).
To demonstrate this claim, I will draw heavily from one of the most influential African
philosophers Kwasi Wiredu. In several instances, Wiredu comments on Menkiti’s analysis
on the notion of personhood. Wiredu comments rather approvingly on Menkiti; he
refers to his analysis on personhood as ‘an article of superlative beauty’ (2009, 16). He
observes that Menkiti was the first one to articulate this notion of personhood in the tra-
dition, though it was already anticipated by anthropologists (Wiredu 2009). With specific
reference to the ‘debate’ between Menkiti and Gyekye, Wiredu is unequivocal that he sides
with Menkiti. In this regard, Wiredu avers:
Onemajor point of doctrinal disagreement is, actually, between the two editors of this volume,
namely, Gyekye and myself. Gyekye in chapter 5: ‘Person and Community in Akan Thought’
strongly disputes the view, advanced by a Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti, that person-
hood, as conceived in African thought, is not something one is born with but rather but an
ideal one may or may not attain in life. I happen to have independently arrived at basically
the same view as Menkiti… . (1992, 8)
This editorial comment is crucial on the part of Wiredu. It appears in one of the most inﬂu-
ential anthologies in the African philosophical tradition. In fact, it is in this very volume that
Gyekye ﬁrst criticised and accused Menkiti of articulating a view that represents radical
communitarianism. Here, Wiredu endorses Menkiti’s interpretation of personhood as
essentially about a moral ideal truly beﬁtting human life and this ideal is not achieved
by every human being. African scholars also observe that normative personhood is
‘germane’, ‘more dominant’ and ‘deﬁnitive’ of African moral thought (Ikuenobe 2006,
117; Wiredu 2009, 13; Masolo 2010, 135).
Finally, Menkiti himself offers evidence that he is after a normative notion of person-
hood. The reader will remember that when Menkiti introduced his 1984 article, he
merely stated that he is after ‘a certain conception of the person found in traditional
thought’. But, we noted that this does not quite help us given that we have identified
three distinct notions of a person in his article. The title of this article is Person and Com-
munity in African Traditional Thought. This title also does not quite help to clarify which
notion of personhood is relevant.
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Menkiti restated his contribution on personhood in 2004. In this particular article, Menkiti
is unequivocal about the notion of personhood he is after. The first cue is found in the title of
the article which is On the Normative Conception of a Person. The article reads more or less
the same as the 1984 contribution, except that hereMenkiti clarifies that he is after an agent-
centered notion. To this effect I cite one passage to demonstrate:
For married to the notion of person is the notion of moral arrival, a notion involving yardsticks
and gradations, or, more simply, involving an expectation that certain ways of being or behav-
ing in the world may be so off the mark as to raise important questions regarding the person-
status of their doers. (2004, 326, author’s emphasis)
Here it is clear that this is a moral notion since it is married to moral arrival. And, I hope it is
clear that this notion is agent-centred since it has to do with certain ways of being or con-
ducting oneself in the world and it is concerned about the status of the doer. Also, Menkiti
suggests that variability of this feature by using ideas of gradations, some may not be
persons at all, and others may have some of it and others more of it. I proceed now to
revisit Gyekye’s criticism of Menkiti and his proposed solution.
Revisiting Gyekye’s criticism and solution
Gyekye’s criticism is predicated on the observation that Menkiti overstates the role of the
community in his definition of a person. Gyekye (1992, 108) refers to a view held by post-
independence leaders and, more specifically, the philosophical elaborations by Menkiti on
personhood, as amounting to ‘radical communitarianism’ (RM). It is interesting to note that
Gyekye is under the impression that the idea central to Menkiti’s analysis is a metaphysical
one (Gyekye 1992, 103). The metaphysical idea under consideration is the idea that a com-
munity takes priority over an individual. Gyekye’s position is that such a rendering of per-
sonhood is ‘radical’ and it may yield either ‘radical or moderate socio-political
consequences’ (103). Gyekye notes that Menkiti ‘succumbed to the temptation’ of employ-
ing a notion of a person that has implications of a radical political philosophy (104). The
idea of personhood as construed in terms of a community taking priority over an individ-
ual is said to amount to this radical socio-political stance: ‘Radical communitarianism’
… is a view that gives an exaggerated conception of the community, wherein the community
is construed as always prior to the individual and this conception of the community fails to
recognize the individuality of the individual and the rights that naturally belong to a
human person insofar as a person is essentially autonomous. (108)
For Gyekye, the political consequences of Menkiti’s position is a failure to recognise the
autonomous nature of a human being that accounts for human dignity and this failure
further engenders a lack of recognition for rights that naturally belong to individuals.
Gyekye’s concerns against Menkiti are informed by his prior commitment to the centrality
of rights to any robust political polity. Gyekye’s position is that Menkiti’s communitarian-
ism must be jettisoned since it fails to recognise the primacy of rights. This high regard for
rights informs Gyekye’s proposed solution of moderate communitarianism. He articulates
his solution, thus: ‘The restricted communitarianism offers a more appropriate and ade-
quate account of the self… in that it addresses the dual features of the self: as a communal
being and as an autonomous, self-determining… ’ (Gyekye 1992, 113). Elsewhere he
observes:
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The view seems to represent a clear attempt to come to terms with the natural sociality as well
as the individuality of the human person. It requires the recognition of communality and indi-
viduality… I think the most satisfactory way to recognize the claims of both communality and
individuality is to ascribe to them the status of equal moral standing. (Gyekye 1997, 41, author’s
emphasis)
Gyekye’s moral-political philosophy operates on the assumption that a correct understand-
ing of personhood is crucial to make progress. It is for this reason that he submits that his
theory is grounded on an adequate and appropriate idea of a self. This idea of a self is con-
sidered to be useful since it grants equal moral consideration to the demands ﬂowing from
an individual and one’s from a community. WhereasMenkiti’s account presents a normative
view of social duties as having priority over individual rights, Gyekye defends a view that
conceives of a self as constituted by autonomy and sociality.
As a way to justify why we should take Menkiti’s thesis seriously, I begin by offering
some critical comments to Gyekye’s analysis. It is important to note that Gyekye focuses
on what we referred to as Menkiti’s understanding of personal identity represented by
the idea that a community takes priority over an individual. I observed that this is meta-
physical claim about personal identity formation and this idea is not an analysis of
human nature in terms of what parts constitute it. Gyekye presumes that this metaphysical
idea of a community taking priority over an individual undermines the individual and their
rights, but does not quite demonstrate this claim. Also, he does not demonstrate how
and why this idea of community taking priority over an individual is related to the
whole enterprise of rights, but simply assumes it does. This claim, as I have stated
above, is a metaphysical one that merely gives us an account of personal identity. It is
not clear in Menkiti’s analysis that he thinks this idea is related to rights.
Secondly, it is crucial to note that Gyekye overlooks the normative notion that is crucial
to Menkiti’s analysis and focuses on an idea that is not the cental focus of his article. More
so, he even subjects this idea to a criticism that the idea does not even explicitly anticipate
– rights.
It is equally urgent that we note that Gyekye’s solution introduces a whole new concept
of personhood that is completely absent in African thought. The idea of a ‘self’ introduced
by Gyekye represents an account of philosophical anthropology that is characteristic of a
naturalist tradition of rights (Donnelly 1982b). Here, some conception of human nature is
understood as a basis for human rights. In other words, some feature in virtue of which
some being is considered to be of superlative value, possessor of dignity, is offered as a
ground for rights (Donnely 2009, 1). These rights are represented as ‘natural’ because
human nature is their source (Donnelly 1982b, 391). This idea strikes me as a patient-
centred notion of a person that Menkiti argues is dominant in the Western tradition
(see also, Behrens 2013).5
It is crucial to note that Menkiti’s metaphysical notion does not identify any capacities
that constitute a human being, but rather it is an account that accentuates the community
as a crucial frame of reference in the humanisation and formation of personal identity. This
idea is not related to rights and is not used by Menkiti to suggest an account of rights; or,
the relation is not made clear by Gyekye’s criticism. If this analysis is correct then it follows
that Gyekye criticises a strawman. And, he imports a natural rights tradition that is absent
in an African tradition for making sense of rights; an idea that is also foreign to this axio-
logical tradition (Donnelly 1982b).
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One must note that Gyekye simply assumes that rights are crucial in an African tradition
but he does not make a case for the ontology and relevance of rights in African tradition.6
And, worse, he does not find a local axiological corpus to push his project of rights; he
simply borrows from the naturalist tradition of rights from the West. And, this cultural bor-
rowing is not explained or justified. It is treated as if it is natural and uncontroversial.
Gyekye has adumbrated an Akan philosophical anthropology, but he does not appeal
to it to ground rights. Instead he draws from Kant’s tradition to do so, to lend credence
to the view that there is no African corpus to justify or even support this commitment
to rights.
To make progress and to rediscover the real African moral-political gem contained in
Menkiti’s contribution that rights are secondary and duties primary, I proceed to analyse
the normative idea of personhood pivotal to Afro-communitarian thought.
Personhood, duties and rights7
There is no doubt that African moral-political thought is generally represented in terms of
communitarianism; and this talk of communitarianism should be understood as a norma-
tive inquiry into what constitutes a good society (Gyekye 1992, 101; Gyekye 1992, 101;
Wiredu 1992, 198–200; Mbigi 2005, 75; Metz 2007, 331; Wiredu 2008, 336–340; Masolo
2010). And, this idea of communitarianism is usually connected to the idea of personhood
(Mbigi 2005, 75). For example, Wiredu (2008, 336) notes:
However, no thought experiment is going to reveal to us the components of the communalist
ethic.8 It is therefore of a matter of great interest that some of the basic communalistic values
of traditional African society can be read off the traditional conception of personhood.
The insight to be gleaned here is that to understand the normative package contained and
entailed by Afro-communitarian thought, we need to visit this normative notion of person-
hood. Below, I demonstrate that the idea of a person promises a morality of duties. The
idea of personhood is generally understood as an ‘auto-centric’ or ‘self-realisation’
approach to ethics (van Niekerk 2007, 364). A self-realisation account posits some kind
of self-favouritism as a proper goal of morality (van Niekerk 2007). In other words, it pro-
poses the agent’s perfection of some facet of her human nature as the sole goal of mor-
ality. Commenting on this kind of ethics, Augustine Shutte, one of the ﬁrst scholars to
reﬂect on African ethics, notes:
(T)he moral life is seen as a process of personal growth. … Our deepest moral obligation is to
become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply into community
with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded (2001, 24).
Another inﬂuential scholar of African ethics, Thad Metz (2010, 83) also avers:
The ultimate goal of a person, self, or human in the biological sense should be to become a full
person, a real self, or a genuine human being, i.e. to exhibit virtue in a way that not everyone
ends up doing (Emphasis in original).
In an article dedicated to exploring various competing interpretations of African ethics,
Metz (2010, 331; see also Magesa 1997; Ramose 1999; Bujo 2001) observes that this
self-realisation ethics entailed by this idea of personhood ‘is probably the dominant under-
standing of ethics’ in an African tradition. So, the idea of personhood entails a moral theory
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that makes it the agent’s chief goal to realise her true humanity. And, when we say one is a
person, we are making a claim that this particular human being is leading a morally upright
life. This morally upright life is generally understood as one characterised by moral excel-
lence or virtue (Menkiti 1984; Behrens 2013).
Above, I have just looked at the one side of this moral theory, I just specified the nature
of personhood as a moral term that implies a perfectionist moral model, wherein a moral
agent has realised true humanity (Metz 2013; Tshivhase 2013). There is another side to this
theory that specifies the means necessary for one to achieve such a moral end (Ibid).
African scholars converge on the idea that one can only achieve such a status by commun-
ing with others, which also entails relating with others positively. In this light, Shutte notes
‘I only become fully human to the extent that I am included in relationships with others’
(2001, 24). Bujo (2001, 88) an influential African theologian, also avers ‘acting in solidarity
for the construction of the community allows himself to be brought to completion by this
same community, so that he can become a person truly’. Dzobo concurs: ‘our people there-
fore conceive human life as a force or power that continuously grows recreates itself and
so is characterized by continuous change and growth… ’ (1992, 227).
What begins to emerge from the above is that perfection is possible only in the context
of communion or relationships with others. Bujo informed us that one can only be truly
human by the assistance of the community and Dzobo also informs us that Africans
think of a human life as available to change and development and the function of morality
is to effect such a moral change. But these assertions have not quite told us how one
achieves perfection. They merely indicate the importance of relationships in the process
of achieving personhood. Metz is more explicit in this regard. He informs us that to ‘ …
achieve the state of being a (person) is entirely constituted by relating to others in a
certain manner’ (Metz 2010, 84 author’s emphasis). He further notes that personhood
can only be achieved by ‘relating positively’ with others (84). To relate positively is best
explained in terms of purely other-regarding duties. It is for this reason that Desmond
Tutu comments thus:
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u nobuntu’; ‘Hey, so-and-so has
ubuntu.’ Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compas-
sionate. You share what you have. It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound
up in yours’9. (1999, 35)
The idea of ubuntu refers to a human being who has attained a status of being a person. A
human being with ubuntu deserves high praise because of how she has conducted herself.
It is crucial to note that Tutu combines the idea of community: ‘My humanity is caught up,
is inextricably bound up in yours’; with the idea of our duties to others: generosity, kind-
ness, hospitality and so on. It appears that because we are naturally understood to be in
relationships with others, these relationships engender particular duties we have to each
other. It is important to note that all the moral properties mentioned by Tutu picking out a
person are purely relational – generous, friendly, kind and so on.
It is crucial to note that all African scholars mention more or less the same purely other-
regarding virtues as those characterising a person (Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1992; Mokgoro
1998). For example, Gyekye (1992, 109) notes that ‘the ideal and moral virtues can be
said to include generosity, kindness, compassion, benevolence, respect and concern for
others’. Wiredu also informs us that one’s status of personhood depends on how her
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actions benefit others in the community (1992). So, what emerges here is the idea that self-
realisation is function of communing with others, which is captured in terms of purely
other-regarding duties.
Thus, the idea of personhood entails a dialogical morality where our chief moral goal is
self-realisation but this goal can only be achieved by us fulfilling our other-regarding
duties. It is for this reason that Gyekye informs us that African ethics is an ‘other-regarding
and capacious morality’ (2004, 89). If this is true then it should follow that the idea of per-
sonhood entails a morality of duties to others. But, what is the scope of the ‘others’ ima-
gined by this morality of duties?
The morality of duties proffers a universal moral vision that encompasses all humanity.
Usually, African philosophers capture the scope of the others targeted by our duties in
terms of the idea of the ‘common good’. By the ‘common good’ African scholars do not
talk in terms of aggregating the interests as is typical in Utilitarianism, but literally refer
to a basket of goods that are necessary for an ordinary or even a flourishing life for
each human being (Gyekye 2004). To best express this idea of the common good they
usually invoke an allegory of a crocodile with two heads and one stomach (Gyekye
2004; Wiredu 2009). Gyekye’s (2010, author’s emphasis) comment with regard to this
imagery is insightful. He notes:
The part of the motif relevant to moral thought is the single stomach… The common
stomach … indicates that at least the basic interests of all the members of the community are
identical. It can therefore be interpreted to be symbolizing… the good of all the individuals
within a society.
The ‘other’ imagined by a morality of duties is every human being. The idea of the
common good represents a conception of a good life salient in African moral-political
thought. At the heart of this conception of a good life is the idea that all human beings
have some basic needs they share in common. These are needs that are considered
crucial for their well-being (Wiredu 2009, 10).10 If these needs go unsatisﬁed life will be
brutish and uncompromised. It is for this reason that Gyekye (2004, 90–91) informs us
that a morality of duties is concerned about ‘social living’ and he also observes that it is
‘related, ultimately, to the basic desires and needs of human beings’. Thus, our other-
regarding duties are efﬁcacious in securing the well-being of all as captured by the idea
of the common good. We may also here brieﬂy pause to roughly look into how African
scholars think about our duties.
It is crucial to appreciate that African thinkers who take seriously the idea of the mor-
ality of duties as entailed by the idea of personhood do not seem to take seriously the idea
of ‘options’ as often defended by deontological accounts (MacNaughton and Rawling
2006). The idea of ‘options’ refers to a line that separates moral actions that are permiss-
ible/obligatory from those that are beyond the call of duty. Those who take options
seriously seem to believe that morality is in some sense limited, it leaves room for us to
pursue other things other than morality (Wolf 1992). African scholars usually do not
take seriously the idea of the so-called supererogation – that there are no duties that
are beyond the call of duty. If morality is about promoting the well-being of all, we
have a duty to do so (Cobbah 1987; Gyekye 2010).11 I hope it is also clear that here we
cannot sacrifice one for the sake of the greater good since this morality is not aggregating
– it is focused on securing the well-being of each and every individual.
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The above analysis is suggestive of why duties and rights will tend to clash. To talk of
rights is to talk of entitlements that engender duties to a right-holder (Donnely 2009).
Rights as entitlements are prior and distinct from duties (Feinberg 1970). To have a
right is to be empowered to make claims, assertions and demands that one’s duties be
fulfilled (Feinberg 1970). Rights are an expression of forms of social living that express
respect for a human beings’ dignity (Donnely 2009). Thus, the direction of duties engen-
dered by rights is right-holders directed. What makes rights special in the modern moral-
political thought?
The specialness of rights is a function of their normative force, their peremptory nature
(Wenar 2015). The moral authority of rights is usually captured by a metaphor that they
have a trumping function (Dworkin 1977, 90). To say that rights are ‘trumps’ is to assert
that under normal circumstances they supersede other social goals (whatever these
may be) in a situation where there is a clash (Donnelly 1982a, 2009). The trumping prop-
erty of rights indicates that they usually take priority over other moral considerations like
global utility.
It is this normative force usually associated with rights that does not have a place in
African moral thought. The duty for one to realise their true humanity takes central
stage in African moral thought and this duty is essentially connected to promotion of
the well-being of other human beings. If rights would take central place in African
thought, this would threaten the very possibility of individuals attaining a status of person-
hood that entirely depends on them prioritising the social goal of securing the well-being
of all. Rights focus on duties owed to the subject, the right-holder. Whereas, the very pro-
spect and possibility of attaining personhood is essentially connected to purely other-
regarding duties to secure their well-being of all. The social goal of securing the well-
being of all takes priority in this moral theory because it is at the heart of realising a life
befitting a human being – personhood.
Put simply, to be a good human being I am required to exercise my duties to others. The
best way to focus on what is morally best for me as an agent is to focus on bettering the
humanity of others. Whereas, rights in a very crucial way engenders duties that focus on
me as a moral patient. It is for this reason that Gyekye (2004, 92) though he is not necess-
arily opposed to rights, notes:
… an obsessive and a belligerent preoccupation with our individual rights can lead to egoism
and the concern for our own individual welfare, to the disregard of the needs and welfare of
others. Such a moral outlook subverts the notion of community, and, consequently of a shared
humanity.
Being aware of the dangers fraught with being obsessed with rights, Gyekye under-
stands that a morality of duties prioritises the notion of community, in a moral
sense, that the only way to realise our moral ideal to lead a truly human life is by
relating positively with others. And, he links this idea to the fact of our shared human-
ity, the idea that there are basic commonalities among human beings, and in a moral
context, their shared basic needs for well-being. The morality of duties charges us to
discharge duties in a context wherein we are caught up with others in relationships
(Tutu 1999). It is a duty, not merely a favour or charity, to respond to basic needs and
desires of others to ensure that they have the basic conditions beﬁtting a human life,
their well-being.
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The danger with rights, he observes, is that they tend to focus on making claims about
the well-being of an individual as a right-holder. Each person is left to their own way and
their well-being is made their own problem – the idea of negative freedom. It is here that
this idea of rights is said to subvert the idea of our purely other-regarding duties to secure
the well-being of others; whereas rights talk about duties that are oriented to their holder.
It is for this very reason of the fundamental clash of rights being self-oriented and duties
being other-oriented that Gyekye’s attempt to marry the idea of community and indivi-
duality in his moderate communitarianism will always fail (Oyowe 2014). Gyekye, after vig-
orously arguing for the urgency, primacy and relevance of rights in Afro-communitarian,
he makes this submission about rights:
… that all this said, however, it must be granted that moderate communitarianism cannot be
expected to be obsessed with rights. The reason, which is not far to seek, derives from the
logic of the communitarian theory itself: it assumes a great concern for values, for the good
of the wider society as such. The communitarian society, perhaps like any other type of
human society, deeply cherishes the social values of peace, harmony, stability, solidarity,
and mutual reciprocities and sympathies. (1997, 65)
Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism fails because of the clashing axiological means
employed by a system of rights and one of duties to secure a life of dignity. In a system
of rights, it is left largely in individual’s shoulders to settle issues of her own well-being;
and, in a communitarian setting it is a function of our communion as human beings to
assist each other as a moral requirement. This requirement to secure the well-being of
all is well captured by Gyekye above when he reminds us that a communitarian logic
‘assumes a great concern for values, for the good of the wider society as such’. It is this
good of a wider society that takes priority. It is for this reason that ultimately rights will
be sacriﬁced when they clash with duties to promote and secure the well-being of all.
This tension is further evidenced by political systems of governance and policy
decision-making envisaged by African scholars by emphasising consensus-based rather
than majoritarian-based form of democracy (Gyekye, 1992; Wiredu 1996). Consensus
democracy aims to substantively represent the interests all and to avoid a creation of min-
orities like a majority system does (Wiredu 1996). This tension is also indicated by the how
land in traditional African societies was usually owned communally for the benefit of all
rather than privately owned (Magesa 1997). The orientation in African thought is securing
the interests of all by cooperation whereas the rights orientation emphasises negative
freedom as represented by autonomy (Wingo 2009) .
Conclusion
This article explored the relationship between personhood and rights. Distancing myself
from a naturalist understanding of personhood as is typical in Western moral-political phil-
osophy and in the works of an influential African philosopher Gyekye, who defends mod-
erate communitarianism; I unfolded the value system of Afro-communitarianism in light of
a salient moral notion of personhood. I ultimately argued that this notion offers us a mor-
ality of duties targeting to secure the well-being of all. It is this high moral ideal of securing
the well-being of all human beings, I argued, that tends to relegate rights to a secondary
status. I am aware that this analysis of personhood and rights is rough and cursory, I
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believe, however, it has given us a sense of why rights cannot take priority in this axiolo-
gical system.
Notes
1. I am not aware of a defense of such a position in the literature.
2. MacIntyre (2003) refers to rights as an invention of the enlightenment moral project. He likens
them to the medieval belief in witchcraft or unicorns.
3. Darwall (1977, 33) refers to it as ‘recognition respect’, where some entity usually human beings
are respected merely because they are recognized to possess moral-ontological feature or
even a capacity that marks them out as morally significant.
4. For a detailed comparison of these two normative notions of a ‘person’ (see Behrens 2013).
5. It is something like this naturalist approach to personhood that Menkiti contrasts his notion
against. He observes that this idea is Western and it is a ‘minimalist’ understanding of a
person as it relies on some psychological basis of a person (Menkiti 1984, 174).
6. I am not aware of any African scholar who makes a case for the ontology of rights and justifies
them. They are taken to be self-evident.
7. The reader will see below I also draw quite heavily on Gyekye to elaborate on a morality of
duties. I wish to allay the concerns this may raise. It is to be noted that that only in his
earlier works does Gyekye (1992, 1997) defend moderate communitarian, where rights are
thought to be equal with duties. In his latter political philosophy, Gyekye (2004, 2010) he
defends a morality of duties that sees duties as taking priority over rights. It is in this latter
political philosophy, I will be drawing. It is crucial to note that many African scholars are
fixated with Gyekye’s earlier political ideas and they largely ignore his latter political ideas.
8. Here, Wiredu uses the idea of communalist and communitarian somewhat interchangeably to
refer to how African organized society (see Wiredu 2008, 335).
9. To say one has ‘ubuntu’ is one and the same thing to say they are persons. To have Ubuntu
means one has develop moral virtues befitting a human being (Shutte 2001, 14).
10. African scholars are not clear about what they have in mind when they use the idea of ‘well-
being’. And, we need have a clear understanding of this term to understand the account
developed here.
11. The objection that this (rejection of options) will render morality to be overly demanding does
not quite appear to emerge here. African scholars think the fact that one has project and
activities pertain to her is not a properly moral issue and one surely is naturally expected to
pursue them. But, morality proper is concerned about social living (see Gyekye 2004, 2010).
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